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Legal Educators Defending the Status Quo 
Brian Z. Tamanaha  
These are trying times for legal educators.
1
 In 2011, the New York 
Times ran a year-long series of embarrassing articles exposing 
problems within legal academia. It revealed that law schools charge 
extremely high tuition and produce an oversupply of graduates, many 
of whom end up with large debt loads and no jobs.
2
 To entice 
students to enroll, many law schools advertise misleading 
employment data—claiming 90 percent or more of graduates obtain 
employment when the underlying truth is much worse
3
—and lure 
students with scholarship offers that carry a significant risk of 
forfeiture, which unwary students fail to fully appreciate.
4
 Adding 
credence to the criticisms, two law schools, Villanova and Illinois, 
revealed that they had supplied falsely inflated LSAT/GPA scores to 
the ABA for multiple years. 
The initial reaction of leading legal educators was to downplay the 
seriousness of the problems. Legal educators criticized the Times 
series as tendentious and ill-informed.
5
 The Chair of the ABA 
 
  William Gardiner Hammond Professor of Law, Washington University. 
 1. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 71–78 (2012). 
 2. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?pagewanted=all; David Segal, 
Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-economics-job-market-weakens-tuition-rises.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 3. This was written about earlier, although the Times series brought it to public attention. 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Wake Up Fellow Law Professors to the Casualties of our Enterprise, 
BALKINIZATION (June 13, 2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/wake-up-fellow-law-
professors-to.html.  
 4. David Segal, Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-grants.html 
?ref=business. 
 5. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, David Segal’s Hatchet Job on Law Schools . . ., BRIAN 
LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Nov. 20, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com 
/leiter/ 2011/11/another-hatchet-job-on-law-schools.html. 
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Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Dean John 
O’Brien, asserted that “the number of institutions that fail to report 
employment data accurately is small,” and “[l]egal education itself 
has never been in better shape in terms of the preparation that we 
provide future lawyers.”
6
 Responding to information that many 
heavily indebted law graduates are not landing jobs as lawyers, the 
President of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), 
Michael Olivas, asserted that this is not an appropriate gauge of 
success: “I do not believe that working in a law firm or going to court 
is the sole measure of lawyers or the only appropriate metric for job 
placement. . . . people who graduate from law school can do many 
things, and do them better than can non-law-trained employees.”
7
  
After this initial period of denial, legal educators increasingly 
began to acknowledge that reforms lie ahead for legal academia. The 
motivation for this shift was partly a newfound awareness of poor job 
results suffered by recent law graduates. But what really got the 
attention of legal educators was two consecutive years of substantial 
declines in the number of applicants. This has put severe stress on the 
financial resources and standing of many law schools. Legal 
academics are now feeling the squeeze and worrying about the future. 
The motivation for reform matters. A person worried about the 
economics of legal education from the standpoint of students and 
society will come up with a different set of reforms than a person 
worried about the survival of law schools and the working conditions 
of legal educators. The critics of legal education believe dramatic 
changes to every aspect of our operation are necessary, whereas 
 
 6. John O’Brien, With Much to Celebrate, Room to Improve in Legal Education, 
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL’S LAW SCHOOL REVIEW (Nov. 1, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://legaltimes. 
typepad.com/lawschoolreview/2011/11/with-much-to-celebrate-room-to-improve-in-legal-education 
.html. 
 7. Michael Olivas, Gauging the Value of a Law Degree, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL’S 
LAW SCHOOL REVIEW (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/lawschool 
review/2011/11/gauging-the-value-of-a-law-degree.html. Legal educators who make this 
statement fail to acknowledge that most people who attend law school hope to find a job as a 
lawyer, especially since legal jobs typically pay more than non-legal positions. As Deborah 
Jones Merritt points out, graduates who do not land lawyer jobs indicate a high rate of 
dissatisfaction with their outcome, reflected in a desire to find a different position. Deborah 
Jones Merritt, JD Other, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:43 AM), 
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/11/jd-other.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/7
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defenders are fighting to preserve as much of the status quo as 
possible. The critics claim that the current system is a disaster—the 
defenders counter that significant reform to legal education will bring 
disaster. 
Two pieces in this symposium epitomize the stance of the 
defenders of the status quo. They acknowledge that there are 
problems and condemn misleading employment statistics, but they 
argue against the necessity for fundamental change. The Chair of 
Law School Admissions Council, Professor Steve Willborn, argues 
that, contrary to complaints of critics, “current prices look about 
right, and the market seems to be working to force adjustments about 
as one would expect.”
8
 Professor Olivas argues against reforms 
designed to reduce the cost of instruction, objecting: “making law 
faculties more contingent and part-time, leaving them more subject to 
top-down decanal governance, and loosening further the minimal 
accreditation standards and federal government loan program 
requirements will do great harm to law schools and law school 
graduates.”
9
 In their accounts, the problems in legal education that 
can be addressed are being addressed. 
My book Failing Law Schools makes a case that the economics of 
legal education are badly broken. For thousands of law students 
today, the cost of a law degree exceeds the economic return they 
obtain. In this Essay, I will recite a few core statistics about tuition, 
debt, jobs, and salaries that demonstrate the magnitude of the 
problem; I will briefly respond to Willborn’s and Olivas’s arguments; 
and I will close with a few words about moving past denial and 
defense of the status quo.  
TUITION, DEBT, JOBS, AND SALARIES 
Annual tuition now exceeds $50,000 at a number of law schools, 
with additional schools poised to cross this mark in coming years. 
 
 8. Steven L. Willborn, Legal Education as a Private Good, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
89, 92 (2013). 
 9. Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not For Whom the Law School Bell Tolls: Professor 
Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools, and (Mis)Diagnosing the Problem, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 101, 130 (2013). 
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Considering the full cost of attendance, Columbia Law School is the 
most expensive law school in the country in 2012, with an estimated 
out-of-pocket cost totaling $81,950, including tuition ($53,636), 
living expenses ($19,894), health insurance ($2,981), books, 
computer and supplies ($3,520), and miscellaneous fees ($1,133).
10
 
About half of the students in the entering class at Columbia receive 
scholarships.
11
 The unlucky half will spend around $245,000 over 
three years to obtain their Columbia law degree. New York Law 
School (NYLS) was the tenth most expensive law school, at an 
annual cost of $74,986. A NYLS student without a scholarship will 
pay over $220,000. Although most Columbia law graduates will land 
corporate law jobs that allow them to handily recoup the cost of their 
degree, most NYLS law students will not.  
The cost of attendance at dozens of private (and a few public) law 
schools approaches or exceeds $200,000.
12
 Most public law schools 
cost less than private ones, but their tuition levels are also increasing 
rapidly. Law students have already paid for their undergraduate 
education, so the full cost of becoming a lawyer for many is much 
higher than this total. This has profound class implications: high 
tuition is an economic barrier that disproportionately inhibits people 
from the middle class and below. Entering the legal profession has 
long served as an avenue of upward mobility and access to power in 
American society, but high tuition is making this path much harder.  
The price of a law degree leapt to breathtaking heights in a 
relatively brief period of time, although law school tuition has risen 
steadily for decades. Average tuition at private law schools in 2001 
was $22,961—a decade later, in 2011, it had reached $39,184.
13
 
 
 10. See Jennifer Polland, The 10 Most Expensive Law Schools in America, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2012, 9:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-most-expensive-law-
schools-in-america-2012-9?op=1. 
 11. The 2012 Official Guide to Law Schools, the most recent information available, 
indicates that in the academic year 2010–11, 49.1 percent of students received scholarships. See 
Columbia University School of Law, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW 
SCHOOLS 224, 25 (2012), available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/publications/2012og/ 
aba2163.pdf. The median grant amount was $15,000. Id. 
 12. See Basic Scores, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lstscorereports.com/?r= 
other (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).  
 13. See Law School Tuition 1985–2011, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/7
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Public law school prices rose from $8,419 in 2001 to $22,115 in 
2011. 
Rising tuition immediately results in rising debt for law students, 
about 90 percent of whom borrow to finance their legal education. 
The average debt of private law school graduates went from $70,147 
in 2001 to $124,950 in 2011; at public law schools over the same 
period, average debt increased from $46,499 to $75,728.
14
 Debt 
levels have been increasing by alarming amounts on a yearly basis, at 
private law schools leaping from $91,506 (2009), to $106,249 (2010), 
to $124,950 (2011). These figures understate actual levels of 
indebtedness because they exclude undergraduate debt, which 
averages about $25,000,
15
 and they do not count the interest accrued 
on debt while in law school. 
Tuition and debt have increased at the same time that graduates 
have struggled through an abysmal legal job market. According to 
NALP, an organization that compiles data supplied by law schools, 
only 56.7 percent of law graduates in 2011 (within nine months of 
graduation) had obtained full-time lawyer jobs with at least a year’s 
duration, including judicial clerkships.
16
 Many graduates fail to land 
lawyer jobs, unprecedented numbers of graduates take part-time jobs 
and temporary jobs, and many earn relatively low salaries.
17
  
A few numbers will illustrate the severity of the situation. A list of 
the highest average student debt for the graduating class of 2011 is 
 
.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).  
 14. Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001–2010, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/avg_amnt_brwd.pdf. 
 15. See Tamar Lewin, Student-Loan Borrowers Average $26,500 in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/education/report-says-average-
student-loan-debt-is-up-to-26500.html?hpw.  
 16. See Press Release, National Association for Law Placement, Median Private Practice 
Starting Salaries for the Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue to Erode (July 
12, 2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/classof2011_salpressrel; Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads 
Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702304458604577486623469958142.html?mod=rss_economy.  
 17. See James G. Leipold, Truth or Dare: The New Employment Market, NAT’L ASS’N 
FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Oct. 2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/1012NALPBulletinExec 
Dir.pdf. 
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presented below, followed by the percentage of the class in debt.
18
 
After the dash, highlighted in bold, is the percentage of the graduates 
at each law school who obtained permanent full-time jobs as lawyers 
(excluding those entering solo practice) nine months after 
graduation.
19
 
California Western School of Law $153,145 (89%) — 39.3%  
Thomas Jefferson School of Law $153,006 (94%) — 26.7% 
American University (Washington) $151,318 (80%) — 35.8% 
New York Law School $146,230 (82%) — 35.5% 
Phoenix School of Law $145,357 (92%) — 37.4% 
Southwestern Law School $142,606 (80%) — 34.6% 
Catholic University of America (Columbus) $142,222 (92%) — 43.7% 
Northwestern $139,101 (73%) — 77% 
Pace University $139,007 (87%) — 36% 
Whittier College $138,961 (89%) — 17.1% 
Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School $138,819 (91%) — 40.9% 
University of Pacific (McGeorge) $138,267 (93%) — 43.6% 
St. Thomas University (Miami) $137,721 (81%) — 49.3% 
Barry University $137,680 (90%) — 39.2%  
University of San Francisco $137,234 (79%) — 34.2% 
Vermont Law School $136,089 (86%) — 48.9% 
Golden Gate University $135,645 (82%) — 22% 
Florida Coastal School of Law $134,355 (92%) — 36.6% 
Stetson University $133,082 (88%) — 57.1% 
Syracuse University $132,993 (80%) — 50.3% 
Loyola Marymount University (LA) $132,875 (86%) — 42.7% 
Columbia University $132,743 (77%) — 94.1% 
Georgetown University $132,722 (81%) — 62.6% 
Touro College (Fuschsberg) $132,302 (87%) — 59.3% 
Roger Williams University $131,754 (87%) — 50%  
 
 18. The debt and percentage in debt numbers are at Whose Graduates Have the Most 
Debt?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/ 
best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/grad-debt-rankings (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). I have 
excluded John Marshall from the list because of an evident error in the numbers reported for the 
school. 
 19. Job Characteristics, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lstscorereports.com/ 
?r=other&show=jobs (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). These numbers are from the chart produced by 
Law School Transparency (LST), which obtained the underlying numbers from ABA data on 
employment results for the class of 2011. “Permanent employment” includes all jobs with a 
duration of at least one year, which includes judicial clerkships. When calculating the 
percentage of these jobs, LST subtracts new graduates who enter “solo practice,” because this is 
a tenuous economic path for new graduates to take.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/7
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Factoring in undergraduate debt and interest accrued would add 
$30,000 or more to the above totals. 
These numbers, combined with available salary data, paint a 
devastating picture. At most of the law schools on the list, many of 
which are low-ranked, less than half the class had obtained 
permanent full-time jobs as lawyers. The median starting salary of 
2011 graduates in private law jobs was $60,000.
20
 The true median is 
likely lower than this because only two-thirds of law graduates report 
their salaries, and graduates who earn the highest salaries report at a 
much higher rate than those who earn the lowest salaries. At low-
ranked law schools, the majority of graduates who obtain legal jobs 
work in small firms, which typically pay salaries between $45,000 
and $60,000. The standard monthly payment on $150,000 debt is 
over $1,700; on $125,000 debt (the average among private law school 
graduates), the monthly payment is over $1,400.
21
 To manage 
monthly payments this large (after taxes, rent, and other basic 
expenses) requires a salary in excess of $100,000, which not more 
than 15 percent of graduates nationwide obtained.
22
 Based upon these 
numbers, it is likely that many thousands of recent law graduates will 
 
 20. See Class of 2011 Law School Grads Face Worst Job Market Yet—Less Than Half 
Find Jobs in Private Practice: Employment for the Class of 2011—Selected Findings, NAT’L 
ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFind 
ings.pdf.  
 21. These figures are derived from the loan calculator on Finaid.org. See Loan Calculator, 
FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/calculators/loanpayments.phtml. To come up with the monthly 
payment, I use a conservative blended interest rate of 7.25 percent, which combines Stafford 
loans (6.8 percent) and Graduate Plus loans (7.9 percent). The monthly payment on the standard 
ten-year plan at this rate is $1,761; on $125,000 it is $1,468. 
 22. The earnings for the class of 2011 can be estimated based on the information provided 
by NALP. See Class of 2011 National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N OF LAW PLACEMENT 
(July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf. There were 
44,495 JD graduates that year, about 40 percent of whom obtained jobs in private law firms 
(17,666). The larger law firms pay the highest salaries. Firms with 500 or more lawyers hired 
2,856 grads; firms with 25–500 lawyers hired 891; firms with 101–250 lawyers hired 1,010—
for a total of 4,757 lawyers. In addition, 888 grads were hired in firms with 51–100 lawyers, for 
a median salary of $88,000. Adding half of this number to the above total is 5,201 lawyers, or 
11.7 percent. This is an estimate because it is possible that a number of grads in smaller law 
firms also earned above $100,000, although this is unusual, and will not show up in the salary 
data. To account for this, I have generously rounded up the percentage to 15 percent; in a phone 
conversation with a person on the NALP research staff, I was told that this is a safe upper 
estimate of the percentage of the graduating class who earned in excess of $100,000. 
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enter a government-sponsored program, Income Based Repayment, 
available to graduates in “partial financial hardship.”
23
  
This is the worst job market for lawyers in decades, declining 
every year since 2009.
24
 For the past decade, at least, about a third of 
law graduates nationwide have not obtained jobs as lawyers, and the 
situation is unlikely to improve.
25
 The U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics estimates about 22,000 lawyer openings annually through 
2020 (counting departures and newly created jobs), at a time when 
law schools yearly put out over 40,000 new graduates.
26
 The legal 
market appears to be undergoing a significant structural 
contraction—involving greater use of temporary and contract 
workers, more outsourcing, more e-discovery, more low-cost legal 
services available online, and more legal work taken over by 
paralegals—which portends tough employment prospects for law 
graduates in years ahead.
27
  
In the quest to get students to enroll, legal educators downplay the 
bleak job situation and future outlook. James Leipold, the Executive 
Director of NALP, expressed consternation at this attitude:  
I have been surprised recently that a number of law schools, 
through their dean and office of career services, have called on 
NALP generally and on me specifically to develop a more 
positive message about the entry-level job market. One request 
went so far as to urge me to describe the entry-level legal 
market as good. Ah, if wishing would only make it so.
28
  
 
 23. See Income-Based Plan, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/ 
understand/plans/income-based (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).  
 24. See Leipold, supra note 17.  
 25. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 114–18. 
 26. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Labor Day, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM (Sept. 1, 
2012, 9:00 PM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/09/labor-day.html; Deborah 
Jones Merritt, More Bad News from the BLS, INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM (Sept. 5, 2012, 
9:48 PM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2012/09/more-bad-news-from-bls.html; 
Employment Projections, US BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 1.7, http://bls.gov/emp/ 
ep_table_107.htm (projecting 21,880 openings annually through 2020) (last modified Feb. 1, 
2012). 
 27. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 167–71; Leipold, supra note 17. 
 28. Leipold, supra note 17. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/7
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Leipold emphasized that this is “the weakest entry-level job market 
that NALP has measured in nearly 40 years of doing this work . . . the 
law firm hiring model is different than it was before the recession, 
and is not likely ever going to look like it did in the last years before 
the economic collapse.”
29
 
THE PRICE IS RIGHT AND THE MARKET IS WORKING 
Despite the gloomy data on debt and jobs, Professor Willborn 
asserts that “the current price of a legal education is about right when 
viewed as a private good that produces an expected increase in future 
earnings.”
30
 Remarkably, he contends that “the current cost of law 
school is not too high; indeed, there may yet be room for increases at 
some places.”
31
 If Willborn had made the more limited claim that for 
the subset of students who land corporate law jobs the cost of law 
school is not too high, he would be correct. But his position is that the 
price of a legal education is “about right” in general. 
His vague and summarily sketched argument is not easy to follow. 
To back his conclusion, Willborn cites Professor Jerome Organ’s 
finding “that law school is worth it (results in at least marginal 
financial viability) for about 46 percent of all Class of 2011 graduates 
and for at least 70 percent of 2011 graduates at about one-quarter of 
all law schools.”
32
 Current prices are about right, according to 
Willborn, because “the evidence seems consistent with the average 
student coming out ahead on her investment.”
33
 His reasoning 
appears to go as follows: legal education is now seen as a private 
good like any other investment; there are winners and losers in all 
markets (“Some investors do very well in the stock market; others not 
so much.”); the price of a law degree is about right as long as about 
half (or the average) of law students come out ahead.
34
 Willborn 
presents his analysis as a realistic, clear-eyed (“not normative”) 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Willborn, supra note 8, at 94. 
 31. Id. at 95. 
 32. Id. at 93. 
 33. Id. at 94. 
 34. Id. at 95. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 41:131 
 
 
description of the facts and even expresses regret for his own 
findings, unable to deny hard truths.
35
 
This string of highly questionable assertions merits no more than a 
quick response.
36
 The notion that the price of a legal education is 
“about right” if half of the students come out positive and half come 
out negative is strange, to put it mildly, and sounds callous. A more 
obvious standard is that the “right” price would allow a substantial 
majority (not average or half) of students to obtain a decent return. 
Moreover, the right price must be calculated on a per school basis, 
not in general, because return varies greatly. (Presumably, the “right” 
price for Harvard Law School is different from that for NYLS, yet 
they charge roughly the same, indicating that something is very 
wrong with the pricing system.) Willborn’s argument begs many 
questions, notably: can the right price be determined without taking 
into account the magnitude and distribution of the losses and gains? 
Is the price still “right” if, for example, students in the loser half 
suffer large negative returns, while many in the winner half come out 
only marginally ahead (and a smaller group does very well)?  
Setting aside the objection that the determination of “right” price 
must involve normative considerations, his analysis fails even on its 
own terms, as a purely market-based determination, because far 
fewer students would pay the price charged by many law schools if 
they were fully aware of the significant likelihood of a negative 
return. Legal educators know that prospective students would turn 
away in droves if they understood the actual odds. That is why so 
many law schools post inflated employment and salary figures, 
including hiring their own graduates to give the impression of robust 
employment.
37
 A fifty-fifty chance of a positive return would strike 
 
 35. Id. at 92–93. 
 36. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 135–44. A detailed fact-based analysis of the return 
on a law degree is provided in FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, Chapter 11.  
 37. Even top law schools provide temporary jobs for high percentages of their 
unemployed graduates; for example, Virginia (17 percent), Vanderbilt (15.7 percent), George 
Washington (15.6 percent), Notre Dame (22.4 percent), UCLA (18.6 percent), and Boston 
University (22 percent). See Job Characteristics, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www 
.lstscorereports.com/?r=other& show=jobs (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). Schools that do this are 
able to bolster their employment rate by comparison to schools that do not. Washington 
University, for example, provided a position for only 0.6% of its graduates, and reported a 
much lower employment rate as a consequence. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/7
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many prospective students as a foolish gamble to take with three 
years of their lives and $150,000 to $200,000 at stake. If this were a 
market with full information, the price of legal education would fall 
dramatically at many law schools across the country. Until the 
information distortion is eliminated (notwithstanding ABA reforms, 
law schools are far from transparency
38
), Willborn has no basis to 
assert that the price of a law degree is about “right.”39 
Indeed, Willborn closes the piece with a series of assertions that 
directly contradict his earlier analysis. The number of applicants has 
fallen in the past two years as more information has reached the 
public about the risky economic return on a law degree.
40
 Willborn 
describes this as a market correction: “the market seems to be 
working roughly but inexorably to address these problems. The 
market is in the process right now of telling prospective students 
loudly and clearly that law school is not a sure bet anymore.”
41
 
Willborn is right about this. But the ongoing correction is a powerful 
indication that, contrary to the thrust of his piece, the price of a law 
degree is not right but rather has been artificially propped up through 
a combination of misleading advertising by law schools and a lack of 
knowledge (and optimism bias) on the part of law students. 
Even with this correction, the market for law degrees remains 
badly distorted owing to a major factor Willborn ignores. Public 
information about likely economic return affects the willingness of 
students to attend law school, but another factor that influences price 
is the ability of students to pay. If many otherwise willing students 
 
 38. New ABA rules for greater transparency are in place, but law schools continue to post 
misleading employment rates. Dean Sylvester of Arizona State admitted that his advertised 98.2 
percent employment rate does not give an accurate picture of the job results for graduates. See 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, When True Numbers Mislead, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 2, 2012, 12:13 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/04/when-true-numbers-mislead-98-employment.html. 
 39.  Although his sketchy analysis is not entirely clear, Willborn appears to suggest that 
the price of a law degree can increase until students no longer expect a positive economic 
return. See Willborn, supra note 8, at 92–93. In economic terms, the positive economic return 
on a degree in isolation is not the basis for setting the market price, but just one consideration 
for potential consumers of legal education when deciding what and whether they are willing to 
pay. Consumers do not make this investment decision in isolation; they evaluate the potential 
return on a law degree compared to other potential returns they could obtain with their time and 
money. 
 40. Id. at 96–97. 
 41. Id. at 100. 
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could not come up with sufficient money to pay for a law degree, 
schools would set a lower price that students could afford (or go out 
of existence). The federal loan program supplies students virtually 
unlimited funding to attend law school with no questions asked. 
Consequently, students who attend Thomas Jefferson Law School, 
for example, can borrow $150,000 to finance their degree, although 
many are unlikely to fully repay the loan (only 33 percent of the class 
of 2011 passed the bar). A private lender would not make these 
economically irrational loans because it would quickly go broke.  
When unlimited financing is provided by the government with no 
prior evaluation of expected economic return, it is dubious for 
Willborn to assert that the market is “working” and the price is 
“right.” By distributing federal loans in this fashion, tuition pricing is 
insulated from normal economic signals, which warps what schools 
are able to charge. The Income Based Repayment (IBR) program 
exacerbates this lack of signaling by making the total size of the loan 
irrelevant; the monthly loan payments of graduates who enroll in the 
program are determined by their income, not by how much they owe, 
so the size of the debt does not matter. Law schools can continue to 
raise prices by telling students who are likely to enter IBR that they 
need not worry about the resulting debt because whatever is left over 
after twenty years will be forgiven. 
The fact that the federal loan system provides nearly all of the 
funding for legal education, cumulatively sending law schools almost 
$4 billion dollars each year, is yet another reason to reject Willborn’s 
assertion that the correct price of a law degree can be evaluated like 
any other market investment. Getting a law degree cannot be 
analogized to investing in stocks because people purchase stock with 
their own money or with money that lenders provide because they are 
creditworthy. That is not the case here. The government supplies 
student loans to allow people access to the legal profession. As a 
condition of these loans, it can (and should) require far better results 
than half of the students coming out ahead.  
When the federal government attaches outcome measures to loan 
eligibility, tuition will fall at many law schools. That day will come, 
one hopes, because law schools have abused their pricing power, 
harming thousands of their graduates.  
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REFORM EVERYTHING ELSE BUT THE FACULTY 
Professor Olivas’s anger at my book seethes through his essay. He 
has a personal reason to be upset: I criticize Olivas for assertions he 
made in his role as the President of the Association for American 
Law Schools.
42
 I point out that his claims that law professors are 
“selfless” and engage in “public service” do not ring true at a time 
when we are very well compensated for what we do. Of course, it is 
not pleasant to be on the receiving end of critical commentary in a 
widely read book, and Olivas is understandably peeved. Since there is 
limited value in responding point-by-point to an essay written by him 
in a pique, I will focus my remarks on our fundamental area of 
disagreement.  
To put it concisely: although Olivas agrees with me that there are 
problems with the economics of legal education, he vigorously 
disagrees that any reforms should be made to diminish the current 
work situation and protections for law faculty. I propose to remove 
from the accreditation standards the provisions that mandate tenure, 
that require support for faculty research, and that limit the use of 
adjuncts, and I suggest that law faculty be asked to teach an 
additional course (going back up to the former norm).
43
 With these 
changes, greater differentiation will come into existence among law 
schools. Two dozen or so law schools will retain their current high-
tuition research institution model (tenured faculty with low teaching 
loads and heavy scholarship); other law schools will focus on 
providing nuts and bolts lawyer training at an affordable cost 
(adjuncts and untenured faculty with heavier teaching loads and 
limited scholarship); other law schools will be a hybrid. This 
differentiation will open up a low-cost avenue to the legal profession 
and will allow students to pick the type of education they want at a 
price they can afford.  
 
 42. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 29–31. 
 43. Id. at 171–81. 
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Olivas is against all of this, claiming it will destroy legal 
education: 
In many countries, law faculties are entirely part-time and 
contingent, and widespread student access is limited by a filter 
of counterproductive and inefficient attrition. In schools such 
as these across the world, thousands of law students enter the 
chute, sit in desultory fashion in large classes for years of 
instruction, and never graduate or move into the legal 
profession. This is not the path we have chosen, and it is our 
glory. At the least, suggestions for improvement should 
demonstrably improve the situation before us.
44
 
That is a worrisome scenario, to be sure. But it is far-fetched to assert 
that removing tenure, cutting back on the amount of time and money 
allocated to research, and hiring more lawyers and judges as adjuncts, 
would lead to his nightmare.  
Olivas leaves out why significant reforms are necessary: the 
tuition/debt/jobs numbers elaborated earlier indicate that the current 
system is not sustainable. We could create the best legal education 
system that unlimited money can buy but still conclude that it is 
undesirable because it costs too much relative to the economic 
opportunities obtained by our graduates. 
Olivas’s heaviest charge against me is that my proposed reforms 
“violate the code that remedial actions should, at the least, do no 
harm.”
45
 What this statement fails to take into account is that we are 
already inflicting massive harm. The pivotal questions, in my view, 
are who suffers harm and how and whether it can be lessened. Olivas 
did not see the bitter irony in his assertion that my reforms would 
make our schools resemble those across the world that take in 
“thousands of law  students” who “never graduate or move into the 
legal profession.”46 That is exactly the current situation for our 
students! (Class of 2011: only 56.7 percent of graduates landed full-
time lawyer jobs at least one year in duration.) The main difference is 
that our thousands of unemployed law graduates are burdened by 
 
 44. See Olivas, supra note 9, at 130. 
 45. Id. at 102. 
 46. Id. at 130. 
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huge debt, which students from most countries around the world are 
not forced to bear. 
Above all else, Olivas is offended by my critical focus on the law 
professoriate, which he steadfastly champions. He is bothered that I 
cite dean and professor salaries in the book and complains that I 
unfairly castigate law professors for being “greedy.”
47
 This 
mischaracterizes my position. My argument is that law professors are 
like most people: we pursue the best deal we can get. One example I 
provide is Texas. Nineteen Texas law professors earned above 
$300,000 in compensation in 2010 (the highest at $351,000).
48
 On 
top of their salaries, over the past five years, twenty members of the 
law faculty received one-time bonus payments from an alumni 
foundation ranging from $75,000 to $350,000.
49
 Dean Sager received 
a bonus of $500,000. Meanwhile, in Sager’s five-year tenure as dean, 
resident tuition at Texas rose from $18,208 to $28,669. Texas law 
students received neither a better education nor improved 
employment opportunities from this rapid rise in the cost of their 
degree.  
Professor Olivas holds up Dean Richard Matasar as a reformist, 
saying that “we all owe him a debt of gratitude” for his diagnosis of 
what ails legal education.
50
 While I agree with much of what Dean 
Masatar has written about our problems, and I recognize that deans 
are in tough positions, I cannot celebrate him.
51
 During his decade as 
dean of NYLS, a low-ranked law school, Matasar raised tuition at a 
rate that placed it among the most expensive law schools in the 
country, and he expanded enrollment as well. In 2009, after the 
market for legal employment imploded, NYLS enrolled over 700 
 
 47. Id. at 118, 120–21, 129. 
 48. See Reeve Hamilton & Morgan Smith, UT President Asks Law School Dean to Resign 
Immediately, TEX. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2011, available at http://www.texastribune.org/texas-edu 
cation/university-of-texas-system/dean-ut-law-signs-letter-resignation/. 
 49. See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Chancellor Orders Review of UT Law School Foundation 
Funds, STATESMAN.COM (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.statesman.com/news/local/chancellor-
orders-review-of-ut-law-school-foundation-2023572.html. 
 50. Olivas, supra note 9, at 123. 
 51. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Unlikely Champion of Reform in Legal Academia—Dean 
Matasar, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 27, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/unlike 
ly-champion-of-reform-in-legal.html (pointing out the inconsistency between his statements 
about reform as his own actions as dean of NYLS).  
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first-year students, an increase of 171 above the year before, thereby 
promising to make an already tough job challenge much harder.
52
 
Graduates of the class of 2011 had an average debt of $146,230, and 
only about a third landed full-time jobs as lawyers, with most of the 
class likely at salaries below $65,000. Meanwhile, Dean Matasar 
earned $572,784, and four professors received compensation above 
$300,000
53
—handsome salaries at a low-ranked law school where 
many students experience unenviable outcomes.  
Or consider the immediate past Chair of the ABA Section of 
Legal Education, John O’Brien, dean of New England School of Law 
(NESL), who offered this objection to critics of legal education: 
“Nobody feels good that tuitions have gone up. But the claim that a 
law degree is a bad investment doesn't hold water.” NESL graduates 
in 2011 had an average debt of $120,480, and only about a third 
obtained full-time jobs as lawyers, most of them likely at salaries 
below $65,000.
54
 For many NESL graduates, this appeared to be a 
poor investment; on his part, Dean O’Brien earned $821,221 in 
taxable compensation in 2010.
55
  
Another example is Dean Rudy Hasl of Thomas Jefferson Law 
School (TJLS), a long-time leader in legal education whose dean 
career spanned three decades at four law schools. Critics are wrong, 
he says: 
There's been a great deal of coverage in the national press that 
has underestimated the value of a law degree and caused 
potential applicants to question whether they should make the 
investment in a legal education. I remind students that what 
law schools are providing is a set of skills that are valued in 
our society and that will ultimately lead to a meaningful 
employment opportunity. To try to measure that by what job 
 
 52. See Segal, Law School Economics, supra note 2.  
 53. See New York Law School, 2010 Form 990, Schedule J, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, at 34 (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.guidestar.org/ 
FinDocuments/2011/135/645/2011-135645885-083e58a6-9.pdf. 
 54. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools, BALKINIZATION (June 18, 2012, 11:29 
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/failing-law-schools.html. 
 55. See New England School of Law, 2010 Form 990, Schedule J, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, at 34 (May 9, 2012), available at http://www.guide 
star.org/FinDocuments/2011/042/152/2011-042152671-0843d86b-9.pdf.  
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you have on graduation, or even nine months later, doesn't 
make sense.
56
 
The employment statistics on the job results of graduates are taken 
nine months after graduation, with little information about what 
happens to them thereafter. Defenders of the status quo exploit this 
information gap to suggest that things are better for grads than these 
numbers indicate. What Hasl omits to mention is that it gets harder to 
land a job the longer one has been out of school, all the worse in a 
few months when a flood of new law graduates hit the market. The 
average debt of the TJLS class of 2011 was $153,006 (second highest 
in the country), and just over a quarter of the class landed full-time 
jobs as lawyers. Dean Hasl earned $395,614 in 2010.
57
 
To lay out salary numbers in this fashion is not to say that legal 
educators are “greedy” but to confirm that, contrary to Olivas’s 
assertions, legal educators are not “selfless” people engaged in 
“public service.” We are not sinners, in my view, but it is fatuous to 
present us as saints. The juxtaposition of law graduates’ high debt 
and unfortunate job results with our generous salaries makes plain 
that legal educators have been doing well even as our students have 
been struggling. Responses by leading legal educators to the situation 
have consisted of empty talk, unsupported assurances that graduates 
will do well despite the bad numbers, or platitudes about the 
wondrous intangible value of legal education.  
As I state in the book: “I must emphasize that many law 
professors at law schools across the country are conscientious and 
work hard.”
58
 Nothing would please me more than to leave our 
working conditions precisely as they are—iron clad lifetime job 
security, five-to-six hours of weekly classroom teaching for twenty-
eight weeks per year, lots of time to engage in research, generous pay 
(ranging from $150,000 to $300,000-plus for full professors), no boss 
 
 56. Katherine Mangan, America’s Longest Serving Law Dean Defends the Value of a Law 
Degree, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 5, 2012, available at https://chronicle.com/article/ 
Americas-Longest-Serving-Law/135512/.  
 57. See Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 2010 Form 990, Schedule J, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, at 31 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.guide 
star.org/FinDocuments/2011/330/696/2011-330696561-083f8794-9.pdf. 
 58. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8. 
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to answer to, and complete freedom to come and go as we desire. If 
there was a way to substantially reduce the cost of a degree while 
leaving law faculty to continue in our current condition, I would 
propose it. But it simply cannot be done because faculty expenses 
typically constitute about half or more of the law school budget. To 
achieve genuine reform in the economics of legal education, faculty 
costs must come down significantly, particularly at the dozens of 
low-ranked law schools where graduates suffer from high debt and 
poor employment results.  
His most concrete proposal on how to reduce costs, which Olivas 
repeats for emphasis while criticizing me for omitting to mention it, 
is this: “the need for law students to live more frugal lives while in 
law school, so that they do not live like law students when they are 
lawyers”
59
; “many law students live beyond their means while in law 
school, by failing to economize and to live more modestly and 
frugally than is often the case.”60 I agree: law students should strive 
to live as modestly as possible, and any who do not are behaving 
imprudently, although I have never had the sense that “many” 
students are living richly (Olivas offers no evidence for his confident 
assertion of its frequency). Needless to say, however, this in itself 
will not significantly reduce the cost of a law degree, the substantial 
bulk of which is comprised of tuition. It is telling that, while robustly 
defending faculty privileges, Olivas would wag his finger twice at 
students—as if it is their fault that they suffer under large debt. This 
almost smacks of blaming the victim.  
THE IRRELEVANCE OF THIS DEBATE 
Following denial and defense of the status quo, the next stage is 
accepting that legal education must and will change. The new 
leadership—ABA Section of Legal Education Chair Kent Syverud 
and AALS President Lauren Roebel—are already at the next stage. 
Many law deans and professors across the country recognize that 
serious reform is inevitable; many are concerned not just about the 
preservation of their livelihoods but also about the well-being of their 
 
 59. Olivas, supra note 9, at 106. 
 60. Id. at 111 (emphasis added). 
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students and graduates. They know that, if more of our students are to 
have a fair chance at achieving a positive return, we cannot maintain 
all the things we desire—we must find ways to do more with less. As 
more legal educators come around to this view, the current debate, 
the arguments of the defenders of the status quo, will quickly fade 
into irrelevance. The status quo in legal education cannot be 
preserved because it is economically unsustainable and therefore 
fated to crumble. The only unknowns are how long it will take and 
how drastic it will be.  
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